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Abstract
We study the possibility of achieving eciency in a dynamic adverse selection market for
durable goods. The idea is to use the number of times a car has been traded (\vintage") as a
signal of its quality. Higher-valuation consumers experiment with younger vintages.
We rst exhibit an impossibility result: no choice of (re)sale prices can induce consumers to
follow this experimentation policy.
We then show that modied leasing contracts can be constructed so as to achieve eciency
if consumers are patient.
1 Introduction
This paper investigates the possibility of overcoming adverse selection in markets for durable goods.
We study the following environment. There is a mass of perfectly durable goods (cars for
concreteness) of dierent qualities, and a mass of consumers who dier in their valuations for
quality. Eciency then requires matching qualities to consumers in such a way that consumers
with higher valuations end up consuming higher-quality goods. Consumers cannot observe the
qualities of cars they have not driven (say, for at least one period); therefore, the ecient allocation
may not obtain, because of adverse selection.
Our main contribution is to exhibit a mechanism that achieves (ex-post) eciency if consumers
are patient, despite the presence of asymmetric information. The idea is to introduce new cars
gradually over time, open markets for dierent \vintages," and induce consumers to \experiment"
with the right vintage until they get the right quality. In equilibrium, the vintage of a car, i.e. the
number of times it has been tried by dierent consumers, serves as a signal of its quality.
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1Specically, consumers adopt the following policy. Assume that there are nitely many distinct
qualities. Highest-valuation consumers only experiment with cars of vintage zero, i.e., new cars.
They keep a car if and only if it is of the highest quality. Consumers in the group with second-
highest valuations experiment only with cars of vintage one, and keep only the highest quality of
this vintage, i.e. the second-highest quality; and so on.
The transactions for a particular unit thus continue until that unit nds the consumer that is
the right match for that unit. Symmetrically, a consumer continues experimenting with a particular
vintage until she gets the top quality of that vintage, and then exits the mechanism. Thus, cars
\trickle down" from consumers with high valuation to consumers with lower valuations.
A natural starting point is to ask whether an appropriate choice of (re)sale prices can induce
consumers to follow this policy. It turns out that this is impossible, except in the very special case
in which a car has only two possible qualities.
We provide an interpretation of this impossibility in terms of the cost of experimentation.
Loosely speaking, for eciency to obtain, the costs of experimentation must become small (relative
to its long-run benets) when consumers become patient. Otherwise, consumers who are ex-ante
indierent between experimenting with cars of two dierent vintages will not be willing to continue
experimenting ex-post, if they get the second-best draw for their vintage. We show that, in general,
the costs of experimentation do not become small when consumers become patient. Thus, a resale
mechanism cannot achieve eciency.
The mechanism we propose employs a menu of modied leasing contracts to separate experi-
mentation costs from buying costs. Consumers who lease a car of a particular vintage pay a rental
cost for trying the car one period. In addition, they get the option to buy the good if they so wish,
at a purchase (or strike) price which is set in advance, independently of the rental cost. If they
do not keep the car, the unit becomes a lower-vintage car and is rented to consumers in the next
group.
Under this mechanism, as consumers become patient, the costs of experimentation goes to zero,
and the strike prices converge to the prices that would obtain if quality was observable. Thus, an
ecient allocation can be implemented if consumers are patient. Of course, since ecient sorting
is obtained through experimentation, it takes time for the right quality to nd the right consumer.
However, it turns out that the expected number of periods it takes to achieve sorting is independent
of the discount factor. Hence this time cost is negligible for patient consumers.
The process whereby cars trickle down from high- to low-valuation consumers has one delicate
feature. The ow of cars of vintage n that is available at any given date need not match the number
of consumers who are supposed to experiment with that vintage at that date. Thus, the mechanism
has to delay the experimentation of a fraction of these consumers. Furthermore, in order to prevent
2consumers from experimenting with the \wrong" vintage, the algorithm must specify that this delay
be monotonic in vintage, i.e., consumers of worse vintages face longer delays than consumers of
better vintages. However, this delay is independent of the discount factor; as consumers become
more patient, the cost it imposes on them vanishes.
We wish to emphasize that, in the mechanism that implements the ecient allocation, the
purchase prices paid by consumers approximate those that would prevail if quality were observable.
This has two important implications. First, it is not the case that the planner is subsidizing
the mechanism.
Second, it can be shown that the mechanism we construct would be approximately optimal for
a monopolist. Indeed, suppose for a moment that the monopolist is operating in a world where
quality is observable, and the monopolist chooses the distribution of quality to optimally screen
consumers  a la Mussa-Rosen (1978). Now suppose that we move back to a world where quality is
initially unobservable. If the monopolist follows the mechanism that we propose and chooses the
same menu of qualities, he makes approximately the same prots as in the optimal mechanism for
the case in which quality is observable. Thus, optimal screening would obtain in spite of adverse
selection.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the denition of (approx-
imate) eciency. Section 3.1 discusses the case of the resale mechanism and shows that eciency
cannot be obtained in such a mechanism. Section 4 introduces the mechanism that achieves e-
ciency. Section 5 concludes with some additional observations. Proofs of ancillary results are in
the Appendix.
1.1 Related Literature
Akerlof (1970) provided the seminal analysis of adverse selection. He showed that markets may
break down completely if there is asymmetric information. In Akerlof's model, goods are pre-
assigned so that the world starts with the owner of a good being in possession of private information
about some variable that matters to potential buyers. In this environment it is impossible to
achieve ex-post eciency. The essential dierence with our model is that in our case, the world
starts without the goods being pre-assigned. Thus, no consumer has superior information on the
quality of the goods. This seems to be a more appropriate assumption for durable goods since no
consumer is likely to possess superior information about the quality of the new goods.
Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) study a model of adverse selection that is closer to the one in the
present paper. The main dierences is that Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) study a world in which cars
depreciate and only last two periods. Their main focus is not eciency although they exhibit an
example in which selling and re-trading can lead to ecient allocations.
3Waldman (1999) and Hendel and Lizzeri (1998) study the role of leasing contracts under adverse
selection in a similar model to the one in Hendel and Lizzeri (1999). Waldman provides an example
in which leasing contracts lead to ecient allocations. However, Hendel and Lizzeri show that this is
a special case, and that in general, in that environment, it is impossible to achieve eciency through
leasing contracts. Hendel and Lizzeri also provide a mechanism that does achieve eciency. This
mechanism is similar to the one described in Section 5, and suers from the same lack of robustness
that will be discussed below.
Janssen and Roy (1999) consider a dynamic version of Akerlof's problem in which used markets
are open at every date. They show that goods of all qualities are traded in nite time. The main
dierence with our paper is that this trading does not lead to eciency: this is unattainable when
the good is pre-assigned. Indeed, in their model the number of periods it takes for transactions to
be completed increases without bound as consumers become more patient.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Model
Consider a discrete time, innite horizon economy. There is a unit mass of innitely lived consumers
who dier in their valuation for quality, and a mass y < 1 of perfectly durable goods (cars) of several
possible qualities. The environment also includes a monopolistic seller or planner, who initially owns
the cars.
Technology determines a distribution of car qualities with nite support fq0;q1;:::;qNg; we
assume that q0 > q1 > ::: > qN
1. For each n = 0;:::;N, the probability that the quality
of a randomly selected car is qn is denoted by n. It is also convenient to denote by Ln the
probability that the quality of a randomly selected car is qn or lower: that is, for every n = 0;:::;N,
Ln =
PN
m=n n. For notational ease, we shall let LN+1 = 0.
Consumers dier in their valuation of car qualities; moreover, per-period utility is quasi-linear.
Specically, we assume that each consumer is characterized by a \type"  2 [;]  R+, distributed
according to the c.d.f. F, with strictly positive density. A consumer of type  who drives a car of
quality q and eects a monetary transfer in the amount p  0 (to another consumer, to a seller,
or to the planner) for one period enjoys ow utility   q   p. Finally, consumers evaluate utility
streams by discounting at the common rate  2 (0;1).
1In the experimentation equilibria we construct in Sections 3 and 4, the quality of a car that has been traded n
times is qn or worse. This makes it convenient to adopt the numbering convention in the text.
42.2 Eciency
In the environment under consideration, the ex-post ecient allocation of cars to consumers (\ef-
cient sorting" hereafter) can be described as follows.
First, let  1 := ; next, proceeding iteratively for n = 0;:::;N, assuming that n 1 has been
dened, choose n such that
8n = 0;:::;N; F(n 1)   F(n) = ny;
observe that  1 > 0 > ::: > N by construction; also, N > , because y < 1.
Thus, for every n = 0;:::;N, the mass of consumers with types  2 [n;n 1] is equal to the
mass of cars of quality qn. We then assign all cars of quality qn to consumer types  2 [n;n 1].
In a multi-period setting, ex-post payo eciency requires that the above allocation be im-
plemented in the rst period. However, if ecient sorting obtains by a xed, nite time T > 1
independent of the discount factor , then the cost of delay vanishes as  ! 1; in other words,
payo eciency obtains provided consumers are patient. We adopt this limiting notion as our
main reference point.
We are interested in approximating ecient sorting and payo eciency. Specically, an allo-
cation achieves -ecient sorting if all but a mass  > 0 of cars (hence, of consumers) are eciently
sorted. If -ecient sorting obtains by a nite time T() independent of , the cost of delay vanishes
as  ! 1; hence, we say that payo -eciency obtains provided consumers are patient. Finally,
we say that ecient sorting (resp. payo eciency) obtains asymptotically provided consumers are
patient if, for every  > 0, -ecient sorting (resp. -payo eciency) obtains by a nite time T()
independent of .
3 Experimentation and Resale
We noted in the Introduction that if consumers adopt appropriate, type-dependent experimentation
policies, ecient sorting will result. This section provides a more detailed analysis of \ecient
experimentation," and investigates whether a planner can induce consumers to adopt them by
selling new cars and opening resale markets.
3.1 Ecient Experimentation
We begin by sketching the essential features of the ecient experimentation policy.
A consumer in the highest type bracket, [0; 1], buys a new car in every period; she keeps it
if its quality is q0, and resells it otherwise.
5Hence, high-type consumers supply vintage-1 cars, i.e. cars that have been used for one period.
Consumers in the second-highest type bracket, [1;0], purchase them and keep only cars of quality
q1.
Consumers in the type bracket [1;0] thus supply vintage-2 cars, which are purchased by
consumers in the type bracket [2;1], and so on.
Hence, if consumers conform to this experimentation policy, the quality of a car of vintage n
is qn or worse. In particular, the quality of a vintage-N car is certainly qN, so consumers in the
lowest type bracket never retrade.
Also observe that the supply of vintage-n cars is positive only for t  n. Thus, in the rst N
rounds of trading, some markets will be closed.
Moreover, at any time t, for arbitrary distributions of quality, the residual mass of consumers
in the n-th type bracket may exceed the mass of available vintage-n cars. In particular, this will
always be the case for vintage-N cars. However, for every integer N, there exists a generic set
of distributions for which available supply exceed available demand in all but the highest-vintage
market:
Lemma 3.1 For every N > 0, ecient experimentation will generate supply in excess of demand









Proof: by induction, using Equation 20 in the Appendix.
Our results in Section 4 imply that the above experimentation policy will lead to asymptotically
ecient sorting for any distribution of qualities and types.
3.2 Resale Mechanisms
Implementing ecient experimentation via a mechanism based on resale presents two distinct
problems. First, as mentioned above, ecient experimentation may generate excess demand in the
market for vintages other than N. The planner must then choose prices so as to clear all markets,
but this creates incentives for some consumer types to experiment with the wrong vintages.
The second problem is more fundamental. In order to sustain ecient experimentation, prices
must induce consumers in the n-th type bracket to experiment with vintage-n cars; moreover,
prices must induce these consumers to continue experimenting if they receive a car of quality qn+1
or worse. It turns out that, in general, prices cannot achieve both objectives simultaneously.
6We analyze the latter problem rst; in order to focus solely on the incentive issues, we as-
sume that the condition appearing in Lemma 3.1 applies, so that all but the oldest vintage are in
nonnegative excess supply.
3.2.1 Ex-ante and ex-post incentives are incompatible
A resale mechanism then functions as follows. At each time t = 0;1;:::, the planner:
1. Fixes prices pt
0;:::;pt
N for each vintage; if the supply of some vintage is zero, the corresponding
price may be taken to be innity (or greater than (1   ) 1q0);
2. Determines the supply of new (vintage-0) cars, and, if there is excess supply in the market
for vintage n < N, clears that market by buying out all cars in excess at the current price.
On the other side of the mechanism, at each time t = 0;1;:::, consumers can:
1. do nothing, i.e. keep their car, if they own one, or remain without a car, if they do not own
one;
2. possibly buy a new or used car, or trade their current car for another (of equal or dierent
vintage).
Finally, consumers enjoy per-period utility.
As a preliminary observation, note that implementing this mechanism will be costly for the
planner, if  < 1. Prices will decline with time (see below), so that clearing markets in excess
supply is costly for the planner. In any case, we shall propose an alternative resolution of the
market clearing problem shortly.
We now analyze the problem faced by consumers in some detail. For simplicity, we focus on
periods in which all vintages are in positive supply; the arguments may be adapted to the rst N
trading rounds.
For ecient experimentation to obtain, at any time t  N and for every n = 0;:::;N, an agent
of type  2 [n;n 1] must be willing to buy vintage n if she does not own a car; moreover, she
must be willing to retrade her vintage-n car for another car of the same vintage if its quality is less
than qn.
Denote by V t(n;) the value at date t of following this policy to a consumer of type  who owns
no car; then










E[qjq  qn+1] + pt+1
n+1 + V t+1(n;)

: (1)
7That is, the consumer pays a price pt
n; with probability n
Ln, she receives a car of quality qn, and
keeps it forever; with complementary probability, she receives a car of worse quality, so only enjoys
per-period consumption and continues to experiment. More precisely, at time t + 1 she sells her
car (whose vintage is now n + 1) and adopts the same policy she adopted at time t.
Observe that V t(N;) =
qN
1   pt
N for all t, because there is no uncertainty as to the quality of
vintage-N cars and, by assumption, consumers in the lowest type bracket never retrade.
Remark 3.1 For every  2 [;], n = 0;:::;N   1 and t  N:






















and, for every n = 0;:::;N   1 and t  N, Ct




















All remarks in this section are proved in the Appendix (see Subsection 6.1).
The benets from experimentation may be seen as a weighted average2 of the net present
value of the quality the consumer will ultimately obtain by experimenting with vintage n, qn,
and the net present value of the average quality she enjoys whenever she receives a car of inferior
quality, E[qjq  qn+1]. Note that, consistently with this observation, we can dene CN = 0 and
BN = (1   ) 1qN.
We now list two necessary conditions for ecient experimentation to be optimal at and after
time t = N, given the price sequence fpt
0;:::;pt
Ngt0.
First, whenever a consumer does not own a car, she nd experimentation with the \right" vin-
tage at least as attractive as any alternative policy she could adopt; that is, ecient experimentation
must be ex-ante incentive-compatible.
In particular, a consumer in the n-th type bracket must (weakly) prefer to experiment with
vintage n rather than with any other vintage. As long as Bn > Bn+1 for all vintages n = 0;:::;N 1








Ln (1   ).
8(which can be guaranteed by choosing  suciently close to 1), by standard arguments the following
condition is necessary (and sucient) to ensure that this will be the case: for every t  N,
V t(N;t
N) = 0 and 8n = 0;:::;N   1; V t(n;n) = V t(n + 1;n): (2)
The cuto type t
N is chosen so that F(N 1)   F(t
N) equals the available supply of vintage-N
cars at time t. Notice that t
N # N as t ! 1.
Equation 2 pins down the entire sequence of price vectors. Also, it implies that the cost of
experimentation Ct
n is time-independent.
Remark 3.2 If Equation 2 holds for every t  N, then:
(i) pt
N = (1   ) 1qNt
N.
Moreover, for all vintages n = 0;:::;N   1:
(ii) Ct












Ecient experimentation must also be incentive-compatible ex-post, i.e. after a consumer has
observed the quality of the car she has bought. Specically, whenever a consumer in the n-th type
bracket buys a car of vintage n and learns that its quality is qn+1, she must be willing to continue




n+1 + V t(n;n):3 (3)
We emphasize that Equations 2 and 3 do not exhaust all necessary conditions for optimality.4
We now show that Equations 2 and 3 cannot hold simultaneously for all vintages and periods if there
are more than three qualities. This suces to conclude that experimentation cannot be supported
in a resale mechanism; of course, the prices dened in Remark 3.2 may also fail additional necessary
conditions.






n + Bnn   
Ln+1
Ln
Cn = Bnn   Cn (4)
where we have used the recursive decomposition of Ct
n and the fact that by Remark 3.2, Ct
n is
independent of t.
3Suppose that, at the end of time period t 1, the consumer owns a car of vintage n and quality n+1. Then she
can either leave the market and keep the car forever, for a discounted payo of 
nqn+1
1  , or else she can reenter the




4For instance, consumers must not have an incentive to delay experimentation. This implies that prices cannot
drop too quickly relative to the discount factor . See Subsection 4.2 for a discussion of this issue.
9Equation 4 emphasizes the trade-os between the costs and benets of experimentation. How-
ever, for  large, the costs will outweigh the benets.
Remark 3.3 Suppose that Equation 2 holds. Then
lim
!1
(1   )CN 1 = (qN 1   qN)N 1 and 8n = 0;:::;N   2; lim
!1
(1   )Cn > (qn   qn+1)n:
Thus, we obtain the main result of this section.
Proposition 3.2 For every N > 2, for any distribution of qualities which satisfy the conditions in
Lemma 3.1, and for  suciently close to 1, no sequence of prices can induce ecient experimen-
tation.
Proof: From Remarks 3.1 and 3.3, lim!1(1   )(Bnn   Cn) = qnn   lim!1(1   )Cn <
qnn   (qn   qn+1)n = qn+1n. Thus, for  suciently close to 1, Equation 4 must be violated.
The intuition for this result can be gleaned from Remark 3.3. Consider a consumer of type n
who receives a car of vintage n and quality qn+1. For  suciently close to 1, the benet from
continuing experimentation is approximately (qn  qn+1)n per period|the dierence between her
payo from the quality she will ultimately receive and the payo she can secure now. On the other
hand, for n < N   1, the ow cost of experimentation is higher than (qn   qn+1)n; hence, the
consumer will prefer to stop experimenting.
In other words, experimentation costs (which are determined by prices) are such that, ex-ante,
consumers are willing to try out the appropriate vintages. However, it turns out that they are
too high to induce consumers ex-post to continue experimenting when eciency dictates that they
do. Loosely speaking, the mechanism attempts to rely on \too few prices" to meet \too many
constraints."
Proposition 3.2 states that, for a set of parameters of the model (determined by the quality
distribution and the discount factor) having positive Lebesgue measure, ecient experimentation
cannot be sustained in a resale mechanism. Thus, it provides an impossibility statement which
mirrors the standard results for static environments (e.g. Akerlof (1970)).
Alternatively, Proposition 3.2 may be interpreted as stating that, for a set of quality distribu-
tions of positive Lebesgue measure, ecient sorting may be achieved, but consumers have to be
suciently impatient.5 This implies that ecient sorting has a cost in terms of consumer payos,
and hence it does not imply payo eciency.
5On the other hand, consumers must not be too impatient: otherwise, in general, Equation 2 is not sucent to
ensure that ex-ante incentive compatibility will hold for all consumer types (not just marginal types). In fact, we
conjecture that Proposition 3.2 can be strengthened by dropping the condition on the discount factor.
103.2.2 Excess demand for intermediate vintages
The possibility that vintages other than the highest might be in short supply poses additional
diculties. We view Proposition 3.2 as our main impossibility result; hence, our aim here is merely
to point to some consequences of demand-supply imbalances, which must be taken care of by
imposing additional constraints on prices.
Assume that there are at least four qualities, and choose n < N   1. Suppose that, at date t,
the supply of vintage-n cars generated by ecient experimentation is less than the residual mass
of consumers in the n-th type bracket. For simplicity, suppose that vintages n and N are the only
ones in short supply.
Prices at dates s  t should therefore be chosen so as to prevent consumers whose type  is in
at the lower end of the interval [n;n 1] from experimenting with vintage n. Proceeding as we did
above to accommodate excess demand in the vintage-N market, we can nd a type t
n 2 [n;n 1]
such that F(n 1)   F(t
n) equals the available supply of vintage-n cars, and choose prices so that
V t(n;t
n) = V t(n + 1;t
n).
Ideally, consumers with types  2 [n;t
n) should be induced to \do nothing", i.e. defer experi-
mentation (and therefore per-period consumption), until enough vintage-n cars are available.
However, in general it will not be possible to force these consumers to simply wait. Note that,
as an alternative, they can buy vintage-(n + 1) cars instead (or indeed any higher-vintage car),
and sell them as soon as enough vintage-n cars are available. That is, they may wish to buy the
\wrong" cars solely for temporary consumption.
If they are allowed to do so, some of these consumers will end up buying, say, vintage-(n + 1)
cars of quality qn+1, and eventually reselling them in the vintage-(n+2) market; we call these cars
tainted. It follows that some consumers in the (n+1)-th type bracket will not eventually receive a
car of quality qn+1, whereas some consumers in the (n+2)-th type bracket will receive a (tainted)
car of quality qn+1.6
To deter temporary consumption and tainting, the prices of downstream vintages must be raised.
But this prevents some consumer types from experimenting with the respective \right" vintages;
as a consequence, the same sort of consumption-motivated deviations we are trying to eliminate
might appear down the vintage hierarchy.
6It also follows that the (equilibrium) inference that a vintage-(n + 1) car is of quality qn+1 is now unwarranted,
and this undermines the logic behind ecient experimentation as dened above. One might perhaps devise a dierent,
more complicated experimentation scheme, which takes this possibility into account; we prefer to take a dierent
approach. Also observe that, with only three qualities, tainting is not an issue. There is always excess supply of new
cars; thus, only consumers in the intermediate type bracket (other than lowest-type consumers) may face a shortage
of their designated cars. Their only protable consumption-motivated deviation is to buy vintage-2 cars; but these
are known to be of quality q2.
11Thus, in general, temporary consumption and tainting cannot be deterred in a resale mechanism.
This introduces an additional source of ineciency.
4 Experimentation in a Modied Leasing Mechanism
We now attempt to resolve the problems we have identied in the previous sections and construct
a mechanism which achieves asymptotic eciency.
In preparation for the formal analysis, we rst argue that, by adopting a leasing mechanism, the
incentive issues highlighted in Subsection 3.2.1 can be resolved. Next, we describe how we handle
excess demand in markets for intermediate vintages; the key idea is to allow the planner to serve
demand for dierent vintages at dierent rates, while keeping prices constant (after the initial N
periods).
We then state and prove our main result: the mechanism we construct achieves asymptotic
eciency for all distributions of qualities|even those violating the conditions in Lemma 3.1. We
also emphasize that the revenues to the planner from the mechanism approximate, for  suciently
close to one, the revenues that would accrue to him if qualities were observable.
4.1 Reconciling ex-ante and ex-post incentive compatibility
In resale mechanisms, prices have two distinct roles: they obviously represent the cost of keeping
a car forever, but they also determine the cost of experimentation. As we noted in our comments
following Proposition 3.2, this may be viewed as the main reason why resale mechanisms cannot
achieve eciency.
Thus, it seems natural to address the problem by decoupling these costs. Specically, we envision
a mechanism whereby consumers rent (or lease) a car from the planner for one period, and have
the right, but not the obligation, to keep it forever.
The rental price is paid at the beginning of the period; the consumer chooses whether or not
to exercise her option to keep the car she has rented at the end of the period, i.e. after learning its
quality.
If she does exercise it, she must pay a buying (or exercise) price to the planner. It is notationally
convenient to assume that the buying price is actually paid at the beginning of the subsequent
period.
If she does not exercise it, she must return the car to the planner. The vintage of a car equals
the number of times it has been rented.
Thus, the cost of experimenting with a given vintage equals the respective rental price. This is
distinct from the cost of keeping a car of that vintage forever, i.e. the buying price.
12The timing of the mechanism is as follows. At each date t, the planner xes rental and buying
prices. Notice that no direct intervention in secondary markets is required: the planner only has
to make her stock of cars, subdivided according to vintage, available for consumers to choose from.
On the opposite side of the mechanism, consumers who have not yet purchased a car:
1. Choose which vintage to rent.
2. Learn the quality of the car they have rented and enjoy per-period utility.
3. Decide whether to exercise the option to keep the car, or return it.
It should be intuitively clear that, by introducing separate prices for experimentation and
eventual purchase, we can avoid the problems described in Subsection 3.2.1. This will be formally
established in the course of the proof of our main result, but we shall provide an informal explanation
at this stage.
An equation similar to 2 will ensure that consumers prefer to experiment with the \right" vintage
rather than with any other vintage. Note that, in a resale mechanism, Equation 2 determines all
prices, and hence the total cost of implementing the experimentation policies.
In a leasing mechanism, the counterpart to Equation 2 will still determine the total cost of these
policies, but not the split between experimentation and purchase costs.
On the other hand, an equation similar to 3 will ensure that consumers be willing to continue
experimenting if they do not receive the best car for their designated vintage. The idea is then
to choose the split between experimentation and purchase costs so as to achieve ex-post incentive
compatibility.
We conclude this subsection by noting that prices will need to ensure that no other policy is
a protable deviation from ecient experimentation. This includes deviations we did not need to
consider in order to establish the impossibility result in Section 3. In particular, we wish to draw
the reader's attention to two possible deviations.
First, consumers may adopt a \pure consumption policy," whereby, at each date, they rent a
car of some relatively inexpensive vintage, and never exercise their option.7
Second, if prices are non-stationary, consumers may delay experimentation and perhaps rent
the \wrong" vintage for temporary consumption purposes, as discussed in Subsection 3.2.2.
In order to deter the rst deviation, we choose rental prices so as to ensure that, among all
possible \pure-consumption" policies, a consumer in the n-th type bracket prefers to rent vintage-n
cars indenitely. Loosely speaking, since ecient experimentation ensures that this consumer will
7For large discount factors, this policy is not protable in a resale mechanism, because the implied \rental cost"




n+1, diverges to innity as  ! 1.
13eventually receive a car of quality qn > E[qjq  qn], for large discount factors no pure-consumption
deviation will be protable.
Moreover, it turns out that the buying prices implicitly determined by the choice of rental prices
also satisfy the ex-post incentive constraints.
The second kind of deviation warrants a more extensive discussion, and motivates a key ingre-
dient of our modied leasing mechanism.
4.2 Market-Clearing and Stationarity with Decreasing Servicing Rates
Both resale and leasing mechanisms run into diculties if prices are nonstationary. Temporary con-
sumption of \wrong" vintages is but one variant of the problems which stem from the opportunity
to delay experimentation.
These problems are not directly related to adverse selection. To see this, consider the market
for vintage-N cars in a resale mechanism. The rate at which the price of the worst vintage pt
N
drops is driven by the distribution of qualities (which determines the supply of vintage-N cars) and
the c.d.f. F() (which, loosely speaking, determines residual demand). The discount factor  does
not play any role.
Hence, for any distribution of qualities and consumer types, suciently patient consumers will
prefer to delay buying vintage-N cars, and this will of course break the equilibrium in the resale
market. The problem is of course not conned to the market for vintage-N cars, and aicts leasing
mechanisms as well.8
We are thus led to consider alternative ways to tackle excess demand. Incidentally, if we assume
that the conditions in Lemma 3.1 hold, then we only need to take care of the market for vintage-N
cars. However, the mechanism we propose allows us to handle arbitrary distributions of quality.
The basic intuition is to restrict the planner to choose stationary prices after time N, but allow
her to serve demand for dierent vintages at dierent rates.
More specically, at each date t  0, and for each vintage n = 0;:::;N, the planner announces
a service rate for vintage n at time t. The interpretation is that, out of the total mass of consumers
who request a car of vintage n, only a (randomly selected) fraction equal to the then-prevailing
service rate for that vintage actually receives one. The planner chooses the service rate so as to
ensure that the fraction of demand served equals available supply.
8This implies that, apart from the incentive issues discussed in Subsection 3.2.1, excess demand in the lowest-
quality market will surely break a resale mechanism, if consumers are suciently patient. However, the methods
described in this section can be easily adapted to resale mechanisms. On the other hand, it is easy to show that the
same incentive problems will aict modied resale mechanisms as well, which suggests that the analysis in Subsection
3.2.1 emphasizes robust consequences of adverse selection for trade in secondary markets.
14The key feature of this mechanism is that each consumer in any type bracket is equally likely to
be served. Hence, prices can be chosen so as to ensure that the marginal consumer type in each type
bracket is willing to rent the appropriate vintage. Excess demand is tackled not by excluding low
types from current consumption, but by serving an appropriate fraction of consumers, randomly
chosen irrespective of their type.
We allow the planner to choose dierent vectors of \service rates" at each date; however, we
shall prove that, if consumers adopt the ecient experimentation policy and service rates are chosen
appropriately as soon as markets open, these rates will be stationary. This implies that, in the
mechanism we construct, after the initial N periods, prices will be constant.
We emphasize that, while at any date t a fraction of consumers will not be served, it is still the
case that, eventually, every consumer will receive a car (of the appropriate quality).
Moreover, the service rate, hence the expected time before a consumer is served, are chosen
independently of the discount factor. Thus, loosely speaking, patient consumers will not mind
waiting. More formally, the ineciency caused by delay vanishes in the limit as  ! 1.
One last issue must be discussed. If the conditions of Lemma 3.1 are met, then all the planner
needs to do is choose an appropriate service rate in the market for vintage N. Note that, since
all other vintages are in excess supply (so that the service rate is 1 in those markets), vintage-N
cars are unequivocally \worse" than all other cars: their quality is certainy worse, and demand is
served at a lower rate.
Then, under the conditions of Lemma 3.1, a minimally modied leasing mechanism, whereby
only demand vintage-N cars is served at a rate less than 1, may be shown to achieve asymptotic
eciency.
However, if some intermediate market exhibits excess demand (i.e. if the conditions of Lemma
3.1 do not hold), then service rates must be chosen with some care. Specically, setting the service
rate equal to the ratio of supply and demand in such markets leads to the following problem.
It may be the case that, for some vintages n and m such that n < m (so that cars of vintage
n are on average better than cars of vintage m), the ratio of supply to demand in market n is
lower than in market m. This may induce consumers in the n-th type bracket to temporarily rent
vintage-m cars, because the probability of receiving a unit is higher in that market, while they wait
for supply of vintage-n cars to build up. This induces tainting of vintage-m cars, as in the previous
section.
Hence, in order to achieve eciency for all possible distributions of qualities, we explicitly ensure
that service rates be non-increasing in vintage. This implies that, if n < m, then cars of vintage n
are unequivocally \better" than cars of vintage m: their average quality is higher, and demand is
15served at a (weakly) higher rate.
4.3 Formal Analysis and Main Result
We now focus on the formal details of our proposed mechanism.
To summarize the preceding discussion, as well as to introduce the required notation, at each
time t and for every vintage n = 0;:::;N, the planner sets a rental price rt
n and a buying price pt
n,
as well as a service rate et
n.
The interpretation is that, if the vintage-n market is open at date t, by paying the price rt
n, an
individual receives a car with probability et
n; in this case, she consumes it for one period, at the
end of which she can decide whether to keep it or to return it. If she decides to keep it, then the
following period she will be required to pay the price pt
n, and will exit the market.
Observe two notational conventions: rst, consumers pay a rental price even if they do not
receive a car; hence, rt
n can be regarded as the price of a lottery ticket. Second, exercise prices are
xed at each time t, but paid at time t+1. Assuming that rental prices are only paid by consumers
who are served, and that date-t exercise prices are paid at the end of period t, is possible and of
no consequence for the analysis, but notationally less convenient.
In the mechanism under consideration, prices are stationary after time t = N, so we shall only
specify a time index when dealing with the rst N + 1 (numbered 0:::N) periods.
At each time t = 0;1;:::, consumers observe all prices and service rates, and decide which car
to rent. Vintage is observable and veriable, whereas quality is neither.
4.3.1 Ecient Experimentation and the Trickle-Down Algorithm
The rst order of business is to analyze the evolution of demand and supply in each market under
the assumptions that:
1. Consumers follow the ecient experimentation policy;
2. The planner chooses non-increasing service rates so as to ensure that supply equals or exceeds
eectively served demand.
We refer to the law of motion of demand and supply implied by the preceding two assumptions as
the trickle-down algorithm.
Formally, denote by St
n and Dt
n the supply and demand of vintage-n cars at the beginning of
period t, for t = 0;::: and n = :::;N. Let S0
0 = 1, S0
n = 0 for n > 0, and D0
n = n for all n.9
9For notational convenience, we assume that demand and supply are also dened for n =  1 and t =  1; the






n, the fraction of demand for vintage-n cars that can be served at time t (Rt
n > 1
indicates that all demand can be served). Then, for every t = 0;1;:::, let
et
0 = min(1;Rt




In words, the planner always attempts to serve as much demand as possible, given available
supply, and given the constraint that service rates be non-increasing in vintage. Clearly, et
n  Rt
n;
note also that service rates are zero in any market which is not (yet) open.
The quantities Dt
n and St
n can be dened inductively in terms of eective probabilities, as
follows. First, at time t   1, en
t consumers who request a vintage-n car actually receive one; of
these, n
Ln obtain a car of quality qn, and hence leave the market. Thus,
Dt
n = Dt 1





where we let D 1
n = D0
n and e 1
n = 0 for convenience. Second, at time t 1 the supply of vintage-n
cars is diminished by et 1
n Dt 1
n , the number of successful consumers who request a vintage-n car in




n 1, corresponding to the number
of consumers who successfully bid for a vintage-(n   1) car in that period, but discover that the











where, again for notational convenience, we let S 1
n = S0
n, e 1
n = 0 and Dt
 1 = 0 for all n and t
(including n =  1 and t =  1). Moreover, we also let L 1 = 1 and et
 1 = 0.







the mass of consumers leaving market n at time t.
Equations 5, 6, 7 and 8 dene the trickle-down algorithm. The following result establishes the
claim made at the beginning of this section, namely that, under the trickle-down algorithm, service
rates are stationary. Moreover, the probability that a consumer leaves the market (i.e. rents a car
and nds it to be of the best possible quality) is also decreasing in vintage, although the conditional
probabilities n
Ln need not be ordered in any particular way. In other words, non-increasing service
rates compensate for departures from the conditions in Lemma 3.1.
Proposition 4.1 For every n = 0;:::;N, et
n = 0 and t
n = 0 if t < n, and et
n = en
n  en and
t
n = n
n  n if t  n; also, e0 = 1. Moreover, 0  1  :::  N.
17Proof: See Appendix.
Note that Proposition 4.1, together with the denition of et
n, implies that et
n > 0 and t
n > 0
for all n and t such that t  n.
4.3.2 Value Functions for Stationary Cuto Policies (t  N)
At time t = N, the N-th market opens, so that, at t = N and at all subsequent times, all markets
are open. In particular, service rates are stationary. If prices are also stationary, the problem faced
by the consumers is relatively easy to analyze.
Hence, we now focus on dates t  N, and indicate in the Appendix how to \jump-start" the
economy, i.e. choose non-stationary prices at times t = 0;:::;N   1 so that consumers are willing
to follow ecient experimentation and thereby implement the trickle-down algorithm in the initial
N periods as well.
In what follows, we assume that the planner has xed constant rental and buying prices rn and
pn, as well as constant service rates en, for each vintage n = 0;:::;N. Thus, consumers face a
stationary problem.
In order to establish the optimality of ecient experimentation, we need to analyze all possible
deviations. However, since the problem faced by the consumer at dates t  N, it is sucient to
consider stationary policies. Moreover, if a consumer is willing to buy a car of quality qm at a price
p, she is also willing to keep a car of quality q > qm at the same price. Hence, it is sucient to
consider policies whereby exercise of the option to buy is governed by a simple cuto rule.
Thus, consider a consumer of type  who adopts the following stationary cuto policy: at each
time t, she rents a car of vintage n, and keeps it i it is of quality qm or better. Denote by Vn;m()
the value of such policy and, for notational convenience, let q
n = E[qjq  qn]; then



















+ (1   en)Vn;m() (9)
That is, in exchange for a rental price of rn, the consumer enters a lottery in which, with
probability en, she receives a car of vintage n, hence (in equilibrium) of expected quality q
n. She
obtains expected ow utility q
n from consumption, and also has the opportunity to keep the car,
if its quality is qm or better. If the car is of worse quality than qm, or if she is unsuccessful in the
lottery, she continues pursuing the same policy.
In Equation 9, m < n implies that the sum in square brackets is over an empty set, and hence
will be taken to equal zero. This indicates that the consumer rents a car of vintage n in each period,







Now Equation 9 may be rewritten as follows:


















which emphasizes that Vn;m() is a weighted average of the expected payo from repeated rental































Remark 4.2 For every n = 0;:::;N   1, wn;n can be rewritten as follows:
wn;n =
1   
(1   ) + n
(13)
Thus, wn;n  wn+1;n+1, and moreover lim!1 wn;n = 0.
4.3.3 Prices
We now x prices which induce ecient experimentation. First, as mentioned above, we ensure
that, if an individual takes only per-period consumption into account, then she prefers to rent a
car of the appropriate vintage. Hence, we set
rN = eNqNN and rn such that enq
nn   rn = en+1q
n+1n   rn+1; (14)
observe that rental prices are thus independent of .
The following remark follows from standard arguments, together with the observation that
service rates are non-increasing in vintage.
Remark 4.3 If rental prices are dened by Equation 14, for any type  2 [n;n 1], the (unique,
if  6= n) best \pure consumption" policy involves renting vintage-n cars. Moreover, r0 > r1 >
::: > rN.
19Next, having dened rental prices rn, n = 0;:::;N, we dene buying prices via the equivalent




and 8n = 0;:::;N   1; Vn;n(n) = Vn+1;n+1(n): (15)
Remark 4.4 If buying prices are dened by Equation 15, then p0 > p1 > ::: > pN.
Proof: Rewrite Equation 15 for n < N as follows:













using Equation 14 to rewrite the pure-consumption parts.
Suppose that pn  pn+1. Since qn > qn+1,
nqn
1    pn >
nqn+1
1    pn+1. Thus, since 1   wn;n 
1   wn+1;n+1 by Remark 4.2, we must necessarily have Vn;n(n) > Vn+1;n+1(n), i.e. Equation 16
cannot hold.10
Now dene the following rental prices:
rL
N = NqN and 8n = 0;:::;N   1; nqn   rL
n = nqn+1   rL
n+1: (17)
These are the one-period rental prices that would achieve ecient sorting if qualities were observ-
able. Our next result states that, if consumers are patient, buying prices approximate the net
present value of rental prices under observable quality.
Lemma 4.2 For every n = 0;:::;N, lim!1(1   )pn = rL
n and therefore, for every m  N,






Proof: Note that (1   )pN = rL
















Arguing by induction, suppose that lim!1(1   )pn+1 = rL
n+1; then Equation 18 shows that
lim!1(1   )pn = nqn   nqn+1 + rL
n+1 = rL
n, because (1   )Vn; 1(n) = enq
nn   rn (recall that
rn is independent of ) and wn;n;wn+1;n+1 ! 0 from Remark 4.2. The second claim follows directly
from Equation 11.
10Vn;n(n) places more weight on the long-run payo than Vn+1;n+1(n) does, and moreover the long-run payo in
the former is strictly higher than in the latter.
204.3.4 Optimality of Ecient Experimentation (t  N)
Apart from indicating that buying prices are approximately what they should be in an environment
where eciency is attainable, the preceding result implies that, if consumers are patient, they will
be unwilling to follow an experimentation policy which prescribes buying a car other than the best
possible given the vintage. In other words, the prices dened by Equations 14 and 15 make ecient
experimentation ex-post incentive compatible.
Remark 4.5 There exists N < 1 such that  > N implies that, for every type , the best
stationary cuto policy involving vintage n entails buying the car i its quality is qn.
Proof: As  ! 1, (1   )Vm;m() ! qm   rL
m < qm   rL
n whenever n > m. Hence, we can nd
N < 1 such that, for  > N,
qm
1    pn < Vm;m(), i.e. the maximal type  prefers to continue
experimenting rather than keeping qm for a price pn; but by Remark 4.1, lowering  from  to
any other  2 [N;) decreases the right-hand side by less than the left-hand side, so that strict
inequality holds for all types.
The reason for the subscript \N" in N will become clear shortly. Coupled with Equation
15, Remarks 4.3 and 4.5 indicate that the optimal policy for a type n 2 [n;n 1] is either to
rent vintage n repeatedly for pure consumption purposes, or else to continue experimenting with
vintage-n cars until a car of quality qn is obtained. Thus, it remains to be shown that the latter
policy is better.
Proposition 4.3 For t  N, there exists N < 1 such that, for  > N, the optimal (continuation)
policy for type n 2 [n;n 1] involves experimenting with cars of vintage n, and buying a car i it
is of quality qn.
Proof: We rst compare Vn; 1(n) and the long-run payo
nqn
1   pn. Observe that, by construction,
VN; 1(N) = 0 =
NqN
1    pN. Also, consumers in the lowest type bracket are indierent between









then, by raising  from n+1 to n, the left-hand side increases by
en+1q
n+1
1  , whereas the left-hand
side increases by
qn+1








21where the equality follows from Equation 14.11 Now observe that Vn+1;n+1(n) is a weighted av-
erage of Vn; 1(n) and
nqn+1
1    pn+1, with strictly positive weights; it follows that Vn+1;n+1(n) >
Vn; 1(n), which, since Vn+1;n+1(n) = Vn;n(n) by our choice of buying prices, implies that
also Vn;n(n) > Vn; 1(n). Hence, ex-ante, the experimentation policy is better than the pure-
consumption policy. Observe that, by Remark 4.1, the inequality is preserved for  > n.
Moreover, Vn;n(n) is a weighted average of Vn; 1(n) and
nqn
1    pn, with strictly positive
weights; hence, it must be the case that
nqn
1    pn > Vn; 1(n). That is, ex-post, after observing a
car of quality qn, type n strictly prefers to keep it rather than continue experimenting. Again, the
inequality is clearly preserved for  > n. This completes the inductive step.
Together with the results in the Appendix (see Subsection 6.3), we obtain the main result of
this paper.
Proposition 4.4 There exists  < 1 such that, for  > , the optimal policy for each consumer
of type  2 [n;n 1] involves experimenting with vintage n at each time period, for n = 0;:::;N.
Under this policy, for every  > 0 there exists T() < 1, independent of , such that a mass 1   
of consumers receives a car of its designated quality by time T().
5 Comments
As promised in the Introduction, the modied leasing mechanism analyzed in Section 4 achieves
asymptotic payo eciency, as well as ecient sorting, for any distribution of qualities.
We have argued that the mechanism we propose deviates from a simple resale mechanism
precisely as mandated by incentive-compatibility issues: it incorporates just enough prices to ensure
that ecient experimentation is optimal both ex-ante and ex-post, and deals with the possibility
that intermediate vintages might be in short supply.
Moreover, the mechanism relies on anonymous information generated by payo-relevant trans-
actions, as is the case in the resale mechanism we consider in Section 3.
We also note that, apart from marginal types, consumers have strict incentives to follow the
ecient experimentation policy. That is, the mechanism implements ecient sorting (and achieves
asymptotic eciency) as a strict (Nash or competitive) equilibrium.
This makes it robust to perturbations in the assumptions of the model. For instance, it can be
shown that ecient experimentation remains optimal if simply driving a car for one period does
11The inequality is clearly strict for n < N = 1. Moreover, it must also be strict for n = N, because eN < 1. To










22not perfectly reveal its quality, and additional, costly eort must be expended to learn it.
More precisely, suppose that, at each date t, a car of quality qn yields per-period utility (q+t
n)
to a consumer of type , for some collection of mean-zero i.i.d. random variables ft
ng. Assume
that, by driving the car for one period, a consumer observes qn + t
n but not qn. Finally, assume
that, at a small cost c > 0, the consumer can learn qn (perhaps by inspecting the engine, the tires,
and so on).
Then it is possible to construct an equilibrium of the modied leasing mechanism in which
consumers always expend the extra eort required to learn the quality of the car; the intuition is
that buying prices can be xed so as to reect the actual quality of a car, whereas rental prices can
be adjusted to compensate for the additional cost c. If a consumer does not exert the extra eort,
and if the perceived quality qn +t
n of the car she rents is higher than the true quality qn, she may
end up buying a car at a price that is too high for its actual quality. Conversely, she may end up
not buying a car that is actually of high quality (for its vintage) because its perceived quality is
low.
Clearly, a positive cost c of learning qualities generates an ineciency; however, the argument
shows that the equilibrium we construct in Section 4 is the limit of equilibria in environments with
positive but vanishing costs of learning qualities, even if the distribution of the noise terms t
n
remains xed as c ! 0.
It is possible to construct alternative mechanisms which achieve asymptotic eciency in the
setting under consideration. For instance, the planner might rent or simply lend a car to an
arbitrary subset of consumers for one period, then ask them to report the quality of the car they
have received. After receiving all reports, the planner can set the price of each car as if its reported
quality was the actual one. In particular, the planner will sell a car of reported quality qn at the
price (1   )rL
n (see Equation 17).12 Consumers then self-select based on prices.
If learning the quality of a car is costless, then it is a Nash equilibrium for consumers to report
truthfully, because they will (almost) surely not receive the car they have rented in the rst period.
This mechanism is simple to describe, but, loosely speaking, it relies on \soft information"|the
reports elicited from the consumers. In particular, consumers would have no incentive to provide
meaningful reports, if this was costly to them.
For instance, the mechanism just described is not robust to the kind of perturbation we have
mentioned above. If learning the true quality is costly, consumers will at best report the perceived
quality qn + 0
n. The planner may of course obtain more than one report, but this implies that
ecient sorting will only obtain in the limit as innitely many reports are collected.
12If the distribution of reports does not match the distribution of qualities, the planner repeats the procedure, until
the distributions do match.
23Thus, in the presence of costs of learning qualities, the alternative mechanism is arguably no
simpler than the modied leasing mechanism we propose. Moreover, it still fails to provide strong
incentives to report truthfully.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of key results in Section 3
6.1.1 Remark 3.1
Rewrite Equation 1 as follows:
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and Remark 3.1 follows.
6.1.2 Remark 3.2
Item (i) follows immediately from the rst part of Equation 2. We prove (ii) by induction. First,






N 1 = BNN 1   pt
N
where BN = qN. Rearranging terms, we get































and (ii) follows. Now (iii) is immediate from the recursive decomposition of Cn.
6.1.3 Remark 3.3
Note rst that, for all n = 0;:::;N   1, lim!1(1   )Bn = qn. The rst claim is proved by
induction, using Remark 3.2, Part (ii): for n = N   1, we have lim!1(1   )CN 1 = lim!1(1  
)(BN 1   BN)N 1 = (qN 1   qN)N 1 > 0. For n < N   1, lim!1(1   )Cn = (qn   qn+1)n +
Ln+2
Ln+1 lim!1(1   )Cn+1 > (qn   qn+1)n, and the induction is complete.
6.2 Proposition 4.1







where the product of an empty set of factors (i.e. t < n) is taken to be equal to 1, as is customary.
We use a double induction argument. First, consider n = 0 and t = 0: R0
0 = 1
0 > 1, so
e0
0 = 1. Assume that the rst claim is true for s = 0;:::;t   1 for n = 0. Then, from Equation 19,
Dt
0 = 0(1   0)t. Note also that 0 = 0. Now, from Equation 7, using the induction hypothesis
for n = 0 and s = 0;:::;t   1,
St
n = 1   0
t 1 X
s=0
(1   0)s = (1   0)t
so that Rt
0 = 1
0 > 1, and indeed et
0 = 1 = e0. Thus, the claim holds for n = 0 and every t  0.
Now assume that the rst and second claims are true for all m = 0;:::;n   1, and, for every
such m, for every s = 0;1;:::. Clearly, Rt



















n > en 1, or equivalently if n 1 > en 1
n
Ln, then en  en
n = en
n 1 = en 1, where the last
equality follows from the inductive hypothesis; in this case, n = n
Lnen = n
Lnen 1 < n 1. If instead
25Rn
n  en 1, then en  en
n = Rn
n  en 1





Ln = n 1, where
the last equality follows from Equation 20.
We conclude that Rn
n > en 1 implies n < n 1, and Rn
n  en implies n = n 1; thus, the
second claim is established.













Observe that, for any t  n for which the claim is true, Rt
n = Rn
n if Rn
n  en 1, and Rt
n  Rn
n (with
equality only for t = n) if Rn
n > en 1; in either case, since by the induction hypothesis et
n 1 = en 1,
this implies that et
n = en and hence t
n = n.



















where we have used the induction assumption that t
n 1 = n 1, and substituted for et 1
n and en 1
using the denitions of t 1
n and n 1. Now, assuming that the claim is true for s = n;:::;t   1,





























where the second equality uses Equation 20 to substitute for Ln
n. We can now use the induction





































6.3 \Jump-Starting" the economy
At any time t < N, only markets 0:::t are open, according to the trickle-down algorithm. If
we maintained the same rental prices as above, consumers who are intended to experiment with
vintages that are not yet available might have an incentive to rent better (lower) vintages for








n+1; n = 0;:::;t   1; (22)
that is, n = t takes the place of N in Equation 14. In particular, type t is left with zero surplus,
so lower types have no incentive to rent any one of the available vintages.
We dene buying prices as a function of rental prices as per Equation 22, under the assumptions
that (1) the marginal type t is indierent between experimenting at time t and waiting until
time t + 1 to begin experimentation, and (2) each type n, n < t, is indierent between the
experimentation policies involving vintage n and vintage n + 1.
Formally, as in Equation 9, we dene the value at time t of following the experimentation policy
which entails renting a car of vintage n and keeping it i it is of quality qm or better, V t
n;m(), by
V N































n; 1(). Observe that Equation 22 implies that V t
n; 1(n) = V t
n+1; 1(n).




1  , V t
n;m() may
also be viewed as a weighted average of a pure-consumption payo, an expected consumption payo
after buying the car, and a continuation payo. However, note that the pure-consumption payo
is not equal to V t
n; 1() (because rental prices change.)




























n;m = E[qjqm  q  qn]. On the other hand,
dV N 1
n;m ()














Ln )wn;m = wn;m, and en
Ln Lm+1
Ln +(1 wn;m) = 1 wn;m, so the result
holds for t = N   1. The proof is completed by induction.
We now dene prices via the following conditions: for every t = 0;:::;N   1, and for every
n = 0;:::;t,
V t
t;t(t) = V t+1
t;t (t); 8n < t; V t
n;n(n) = V t
n+1;n+1(n): (24)
27Note that Equation 24, together with Remark 6.1, implies that V t
t;t() > V t+1
t;t () for  > t, and
hence V t
n;n(n) > V t+1
n;n (n) for n < t. That is, every consumer type other than t will strictly
prefer to begin experimenting with her designated vintage immediately rather than in the next
period.
It is convenient to also dene pN
n = pn, n = 0;:::;N.
Proposition 6.1 If buying prices at times t = 0;:::;N are dened as above, then there exists 
such that, for  > , and for every t = 0;:::;N:
(1) pt





t = V t+1
t;t (t).
(3) If t < N, then for every n = 0;:::;t, pt
n > pt+1
n ; thus, V t
n;m() < V t+1
n;m() for all  2 [t;]
and t  m  n.




n; also, V t
n;n(n)  V t
n; 1(n),
with equality only for n = t = N.
(5) For every n = 0;:::;t,  2 [t;] and m 2 fn;:::;tg, lim!1(1   )pt
n = rL








(6) For every n = 0;:::;t   1,  2 [t;] and m 2 fn + 1;tg,
qm
1    pt
n < V t+1
m;m().
Proof: For t = N, (1), (4), (5) and (6) restate results in the previous subsection; with the obvious
convention that V N+1
N;N = VN;N, (2) holds because both sides of the equation are zero; nally, (3)
does not apply. It will be crucial to note that prices and values become at and after time t = N.
Now suppose the result is true for some t + 1, t < N. Note that V t




















for n < t, where we used Equation 22 to eliminate the per-period consumption terms, and Equation
24 for time t + 1 to reduce the weights multiplying the continuation value terms to n and n+1
respectively. As in the previous subsection, V t+1
n;n (n) = V t+1
n+1;n+1(n) and n  n+1 imply that
pt
n > pt
n+1, so (1) follows.
To prove (2), note that V t
t;t(t) = V t+1










+ (1   t)V t+1




t = 0 by construction, and we can subtract V t+1
t;t (t) from both sides. Since t > 0,
(2) follows.
28We now prove (3) by induction on n. For n = t, note that, by (2),
tqt
1    pt
t = V t+1
t;t (t);






t (the rst inequality is weak only if t = N   1). This implies pt
t > pt+1
t .
Now suppose that pt
n+1 > pt+1
n+1 for some n < t. Note that, at time t + 1, an equation corre-
sponding to 25 must hold. Hence, it must be the case that
n[(pt
n   pt+1
n ) + (V t+1
n;n (n)   V t+2
n;n (n))] = n+1[(pt
n+1   pt+1
n+1) + (V t+1
n+1;n+1(n)   V t+2
n+1;n+1(n))]
so that, since V 
n;n(n) = V 















n;n (n)   V t+1
n;n (n)];
also recall that n  n+1. Now, if t = N   1, the second term in the above weighted average is
zero; otherwise, by the induction hypothesis, it is positive, because (3) holds at time t + 1. Thus,




n , so the induction on n is completed. Finally, since,




n for all n = 0;:::;t, Equation 23 and the induction hypothesis
imply that V t
n;m() < V t+1
n;m() for all types  and t  m  n. Thus, (3) holds at time t.
To prove (4), we again apply induction on n. For n = t, we have V t
t;t(t) = V t+1
t;t (t) and, since
etq
tt   rt
t = 0, V t
t; 1(t) = V t+1
t; 1(t). Hence, the induction hypothesis on t implies that (4) holds
at time t + 1, which in turn yields V t
t;t(t) > V t
t; 1(t).
Now assume that V t
n+1;n+1(n+1) > V t
n+1; 1(n+1) for some n < t. By Remark 6.1, this implies
that V t
n+1;n+1(n) > V t
n+1; 1(n) = V t
n; 1(n), so also V t
n;n(n) > V t
n; 1(n).
To prove the remaining inequalities, recall that, as was noted in the text, V t














By the induction hypothesis on t, V t+1
n;n (n) > V t+1
n; 1(n) > V t
n; 1(n); thus, there exists 1
such that, for  > 1, nV t
n;n(n) > enq
nn   rt
n, and hence nV t+1







n, then for  > 1 the above inequality is violated. Hence, for





To prove (5), by (2) and the induction hypothesis on t, lim!1(1   )pt
t = tqt   lim!1(1  
)V t+1
t;t (t) = tqt   (tqt   rL
t ) = rL
t , as needed. Now assume that the claim is true at time t for




n   (nqn   rt
n)] = n+1[nqn+1   rL
n+1   (nqn+1   rL
n)] = 0


























so the result follows.




lim!1(1   )V t+1
m;m(). Hence, it is possible to choose t < 1 such that, for  > t implies that, for
all n and m as in the claim,
qm
1    pt
n < V t+1
m;m(); the claim now follows from Remark 6.1.
To complete the proof, let  = minf0;:::;Ng.
We now show, by backward induction on t, that the experimentation policy involving vintage
n is optimal for each type  2 [n;n 1]. The previous subsection shows that this is the case for
t = N. Now suppose that it is also the case at time t + 1  N, and consider the problem faced by
a type  2 [n;n 1] at time t.
By the induction hypothesis, if the agent does not leave the market at time t (i.e. if she does not
buy a car), her continuation strategy at time t+1 may be assumed to be the experimentation policy
involving vintage n. By Proposition 6.1, (6), for  >  a consumer who has rented a vintage-m car
at time t will only keep it if it is of quality qm. Moreover, Equation 22 ensures that a consumer
of type  2 [n;n 1] who is only interested in time-t consumption will rent a car of vintage n.
Thus, the optimal continuation policy at time t is necessarily one of the following: (P1) rent a car
of vintage n at t, do not buy it regardless of its quality, and experiment with vintage n beginning
with time t+1; (P2) rent a car of vintage m 6= n at t, keep it i it is of quality qm, and experiment
with vintage n beginning with time t + 1; (P3) experiment with vintage n beginning with time t.
Now Proposition 6.1, (4) shows that, for  > , if a consumer of type  2 [n;n 1] rents a car
of vintage n which turns out to be of quality qn, then she strictly prefers to buy it rather than
experiment with vintage n beginning with time t + 1; hence, (P1) above cannot be the optimal
policy.
Next, suppose that a consumer of type  2 [n;n 1] rents a car of vintage m which turns out to
be of quality qm, with m 6= n. By Proposition 6.1, (5), qm   lim!1 pt
m = qm   rL
m  qn   rL
n =
lim!1(1   )V t+1
n;n (), with equality only for type n and for m = n   1. However, note that,
since V t+1
n+1;n+1(n) = V t+1
n;n (n), the value to type n of experimenting with vintage n+1 at time t,



















+ (1   n+1)V t+1
n+1;n+1(n) =
= V t
n+1;n+1(n) = V t
n;n(n)
for type n, and strictly less than V t
n;n(n) for any type  2 (n;n 1].13 Hence, we can disregard
this particular policy at time t.
For any other vintage m 62 fn;n + 1g, we can nd 
t;n;m such that, for  > 
t;n;m:
(1) if qm > wn;nenq
n + (1   wn;n)qn,
qmn 1
1    pt
m < V t+1
n;n (n 1); by Remark 6.1, the same
inequality will hold for all lower types  2 [n;n 1);
(2) if qm  wn;nenq
n + (1   wn;n)qn,
qmn
1    pt
m < V t+1
n;n (n); again by Remark 6.1, the same
inequality will hold for all higher types  2 (n;n 1].
Thus, for  > 
t = maxf
t;n;m : n = 0;:::;N; m 62 fn;n + 1gg, no policy of type (P2) can be
optimal at time t. Hence, the optimal policy at time t involves experimenting with vintage n, and
the induction is complete.
Taking  = maxf;
0;:::;
N 1g, we get Proposition 4.4.
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(see the proof of Remark 6.1).
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